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CONSENT TO THE FILING OF AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF 
 All parties to this litigation have consented to the filing of this Amicus 
Curiae Brief.  See Fed. R. App. P. 29(a).   
IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE 
Mountain States Legal Foundation (“MSLF”) is a non-profit, public interest 
legal foundation organized under the laws of the State of Colorado.  MSLF’s 
members include individuals who live and work in every State of the Nation.  
MSLF is dedicated to bringing before the courts those issues vital to the defense 
and preservation of private property rights, individual liberties, limited and ethical 
government, and the free enterprise system.   
Central to the notion of a limited government is the constitutional principle 
of enumerated powers: those powers not explicitly delegated to the federal 
government are reserved for the States and the people.  These limited powers 
include Congress’s commerce power, as conferred by the Commerce Clause.  
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.  MSLF believes that Congress often exceeds its 
commerce power to justify vastly increasing the scope of congressional legislation 
beyond what is constitutionally permissible.  The result of such overreaching is a 
federal government that is no longer limited and ethical, and further erosion of 
individual liberty, the right to own and use property, and the free enterprise system.  
Therefore, MSLF has often participated as amicus curiae in cases involving 
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Commerce Clause issues.  E.g., San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Authority v. 
Salazar, No. 10-15192 (9th Cir.), Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006), 
GDF Realty Investments, LTD v. Norton, 362 F.3d 286 (D.C. Cir. 2004), and 
Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062 (D.C. Cir. 2003).  More importantly, 
MSLF filed an amicus curiae brief in the legally analogous Virginia ex rel. 
Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, No. 10-cv-188 (E.D. Virginia) and Thomas More Law 
Center v. Obama, No. 10-2388 (6th Cir.).   
In this case, the District Court held that the Individual Mandate component 
of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 
119 (2010), amended by the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 
2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010) (“PPACA”), was constitutional.  
In so doing, the District Court held that “decisions to pay for health care without 
insurance are economic activities,” and, therefore, “the individual coverage 
requirement is a valid exercise of federal power under the Commerce Clause, even 
as applied to the facts of this case.”  Liberty University v. Geithner, ___F. Supp. 
2d___, 2010 WL 4860299, *15–*16 (2010).  If this decision is allowed to stand, it 
would eviscerate the doctrine of enumerated powers upon which the federal 
government was established.  Therefore, MSLF respectfully submits this amicus 
curiae brief in support of Plaintiffs-Appellants. 
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ARGUMENT 
 Sections 1501 and 1502 of the PPACA include an “Individual Mandate” that 
requires all non-exempt Americans to maintain what Congress deems to be an 
acceptable level of health insurance coverage.  The Individual Mandate was passed 
purportedly pursuant to Congress’s enumerated power under the Commerce Clause 
of the U.S. Constitution, which provides:  “Congress shall have Power . . . to 
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with 
the Indian tribes[.]”  U.S. Const. art. I, § 8.  By purporting to derive its power to 
enact the Individual Mandate from the Commerce Clause, Congress engaged in an 
unprecedented power grab, wholly at odds with the principle of enumerated 
powers upon which the federal government was established.  See Op. Br. at 29–31.   
I. THE PRINCIPLE OF A LIMITED FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 
OF ENUMERATED POWERS IS DEEPLY ROOTED IN THE 
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. 
A. The Principle Of A Limited Government Of Enumerated 
Powers Can Be Traced Back To The Pre-Revolutionary 
Period. 
In the 18th century, British power was concentrated entirely in the “King-in-
Parliament” (i.e., the King, Lords, and Commons).  Akhil Reed Amar, Of 
Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 Yale L.R. 1425, 1431 (1987).  Britons understood 
this power as being absolute.  Id.; see also William Blackstone, Of the Nature of 
Laws in General, in Commentaries on the Laws of England § 2 (1765–69) (In all 
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governments, there is “a supreme, irresistible, absolute, uncontrolled authority, in 
which the jura summi imperii or the rights of sovereignty, reside.”) available at 
http://www.lonang.com/exlibris/blackstone/bla-002.htm.  Many American 
colonists, however, due in part to their struggles with the British Parliament, had 
developed a profoundly different view of government—one in which all power 
was derived from the people themselves.  Kurt T. Lash, Leaving the Chisholm 
Trail: The Eleventh Amendment and the Background Principle of Strict 
Construction, 50 Wm. & Mary L.R. 1577, 1593 (2009).  
The colonial governments themselves reinforced the colonists’ 
understanding that a government derives its power from the people.  Typically, 
each colony was governed by a corporate charter.  Amar, supra, at 1432–33.  
These charters, such as the Massachusetts Bay Company Charter, established a 
governor and other governmental agents, much like corporate agents.  Id. at 1433.  
It was, therefore, understood that, like corporate agents, the colonial governmental 
officials possessed only specific, enumerated powers; purported government 
actions beyond the scope of the charter had no legal authority.  Id. at 1433–35 
(citing A. McLaughlin, The Foundations of American Constitutionalism 38–65, 
104–28 (1961)).  Thus, unlike in Britain, many colonists believed that 
parliamentary acts that conflicted with principles in the Magna Carta (“Great 
Charter”) were null and void.  Amar, supra, at 1432–34. 
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As a result, many colonists objected not only to Parliament’s actual policies, 
but also to the principle that the power of Parliament was unlimited.  Amar, supra, 
at 1430.  The Boston Tea Party, for example, was a protest against both a tax on 
tea and the notion that Parliament had the power to tax tea.  Id. n.21 (citing J. 
Blum, E. Morgan, W. Rose, A. Schlesinger, K. Stampp, and C. Woodward, The 
National Experience 94 (1973)).  Indeed, the Tea Party took place after Parliament 
had reduced a tax on tea in an attempt to acclimate colonists to the principle of 
plenary parliamentary taxation powers.  Id.  Thus, the predominant colonial view 
was that Parliament’s power was not absolute but, instead, was limited.  Id. 
B. The Principle Of A Limited Government Of Enumerated 
Powers Is Evident In The Declaration of Independence.   
In 1776, the Founders used the principle of a limited government of 
enumerated powers as their primary justification for independence from England.  
The Declaration of Independence famously provides that individuals are “endowed 
by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights.”  Declaration of Independence 
para. 2 (U.S. 1776).  In other words, rights are not derived from Parliament or any 
other governmental body, but, instead, exist by virtue of an individual’s existence.  
The Declaration, therefore:  
[S]peaks simply to the question of whether rights come from 
government by posing, in effect, the question of where government 
would get its rights if not from the people—it being clear that people 
create and hence come before government.  In both logic and time, 
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then, people come first, government second.  That was the central 
point the Founders sought to pin down. 
Roger Pilon, The Purpose and Limits of Government, Cato’s Letter #13 6 (1999).  
The unalienable rights possessed by the people—generally, the right to be free and 
independent—were far too numerous to be listed specifically, though the Founders 
sought generally to capture the essence of these rights by providing that “among 
these [rights] are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.”  Declaration of 
Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776).   
In addition to the unalienable rights, John Locke1 explained that each 
individual possesses an “Executive Power,” i.e., the right to secure an individual’s 
unalienable rights.  Pilon, supra, at 15 (citing John Locke, Second Treatise of Civil 
Government § 13 (1690)).  Accordingly, the Declaration of Independence provides 
a mechanism for securing the unalienable rights of the people.  The Declaration 
explains that governments are “instituted” for the limited purpose of “secur[ing] 
these rights” of the people, and the authority of the government to secure these 
                                                 
1 As has been documented frequently, John Locke was the primary philosophical 
influence for Thomas Jefferson, the principal author of the Declaration of 
Independence.  See, e.g., American Civil Liberties Union of Kentucky v. McCreary 
County, Kentucky, 354 F.3d 438, 453 n.7 (6th Cir. 2003) aff’d, 545 U.S. 844 
(2005) (citing Carl Becker, The Declaration of Independence:  A Study in the 
History of Ideas 79 (1922) (noting that with respect to “the political philosophy of 
Nature and natural rights” referenced in the Declaration that the “lineage is direct:  
Jefferson copied Locke”)). 
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rights is “derive[ed] . . . from the consent of the governed.”  Declaration of 
Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776).   
Consequently, the government’s power exists solely because the people have 
conferred upon the government their right to secure their inalienable rights.  
Naturally, then, for the government to have the power to secure a purported right, 
individuals must first have possessed that power, and then, through the consent of 
the governed, must have delegated that power to the government.  This provides 
the foundational premise behind the principle of enumerated powers.2   
C. The Principle Of A Limited Government Of Enumerated 
Powers Is Explicitly Included In The Articles Of 
Confederation. 
 In the years following the Declaration of Independence, the principle of a 
limited government of enumerated powers was not abandoned.  On the contrary, 
the Articles of Confederation, the first constitutional document in the United 
States, begins by providing, “Each state retains its sovereignty, freedom, and 
independence, and every Power, Jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this 
confederation expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled.”3   
                                                 
2 In the specific context of this case, for the government to secure a purported 
“right” to affordable health care, individuals must first have possessed the right to 
force other individuals to acquire health insurance or pay a penalty.  Because 
individuals have never possessed such a right, they could not possibly have 
delegated that right to the government. 
3 James Madison clarified that, in this context, “states” “means the people 
composing those political societies, in their highest sovereign capacity.”  James 
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Articles of Confederation, art. II.  Only after so providing does the document 
proceed to discuss which enumerated powers were delegated to the United States 
government.  See Articles of Confederation, art. IX.  Thus, the Founders, keenly 
aware of the dangers that resulted from a tyrannical English government, were 
careful to create a limited government possessing only a few enumerated powers.4   
D. The Principle Of A Limited Government Of Enumerated 
Powers Is Enshrined In The Constitution. 
1. The Constitutional Convention proposed a federal 
government of enumerated powers. 
 “The constitution was, from its very origin, contemplated to be the frame of 
a national government, of special and enumerated powers, and not of general and 
unlimited powers.  This is apparent . . . from the history of the proceedings of the 
convention, which framed it. . . .”  Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution 
of the United States 2 § 906 (1833) available at 
                                                                                                                                                             
Madison, Report on the Virginia Resolutions (Jan. 1800), available at http://press-
pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch8s42.html.   
4 The Articles of Confederation, however, were inadequate because, inter alia, they 
did not sufficiently limit the power of state governments.  States had become 
engaged in the practice of enacting protectionist legislation to protect local 
industries and businesses.  See, e.g., Dept. of Revenue of Kentucky v. Davis, 553 
U.S. 328, 363 (2008) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  The Founders ultimately rectified 
this deficiency with the insertion of the Commerce Clause in the Constitution.  See, 
e.g., C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, N.Y., 511 U.S. 383, 390 (1994) 
(citing The Federalist No. 22, at  143–145 (Alexander Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed., 
1961); James Madison, Vices of the Political System of the United States, in 2 
Writings of James Madison 362–363 (G. Hunt ed. 1901)).  The Commerce Clause, 
therefore, fulfilled the Founders’ desire to ensure free trade amongst the States, 
unrestrained by governmental biases, prejudices, or regulations.  
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http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/a1_8_1s28.html.  At the very 
beginning of the Constitutional Convention, James Madison expressed his desire 
for a national government of explicitly enumerated powers, though he was 
uncertain whether such an enumeration could be accomplished.  William Ewald, 
James Wilson and the Drafting of the Constitution, 10 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 901, 945 
(2008).  Other delegates of the Convention, though not all, similarly expressed 
support for an enumeration of powers.  Id. at 986–87 (citing 1 The Records of the 
Federal Convention of 1787 53 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966)).   
 After a month of debate on a wide range of issues, the delegates of the 
Convention appointed a committee “for the purpose of reporting a Constitution 
conformably to the Proceedings aforesaid” so that, going forward, the delegates 
would have one tangible document on which to debate.  Id. at 982 (citing 2 The 
Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 85 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. (1966))).  
This Committee of Detail5 began its work with a broad, general sketch of the 
legislative branch provided to it by the Convention: 
Resolved[.]  That the Legislature of the United States ought to possess 
the legislative Rights vested in Congress by the Confederation; and 
moreover to legislate in all Cases for the general Interests of the 
Union, and also in those Cases to which the States are separately 
                                                 
5 The Committee of Detail was comprised of five delegates:  Nathaniel Gorham, 
Massachusetts; Oliver Ellsworth, Connecticut; Edmund Randolph, Virginia; John 
Rutledge, South Carolina; and James Wilson, Pennsylvania.  Ewald, supra, at 982 
(citing 1 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 87). 
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incompetent, or in which the Harmony of the United States may be 
interrupted by the Exercise of individual Legislation.   
Id. at 986 (citing 1 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 53).   
 After nearly two weeks of work, the Committee of Detail presented its final 
document to the Convention as a whole.  Id. at 993.  The document that emerged 
introduced 18 specifically enumerated powers for the national legislature, rather 
than a general grant of legislative powers.  Id. at 986–93.  Ultimately, most of the 
proposed enumerated powers were accepted and some were rejected.  Id.  
Importantly, though, none of the delegates questioned the principle that the 
national government should be limited and comprised solely of defined, 
enumerated powers.  Id. at 994.  
2. The text of the Constitution explicitly creates a 
federal government of enumerated powers. 
 This principle of a limited federal government comprised of defined, 
enumerated powers was written expressly into the text of the Constitution.  Unlike 
Article II of the Constitution, which begins, “The executive Power shall be vested 
in a President of the United States of America,” and unlike Article III of the 
Constitution, which begins, “The judicial Power of the United States, shall be 
vested in one supreme Court . . . ,” Article I of the Constitution begins, “All 
legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress.”  U.S. Const. art. 
I–III (emphasis added).  In so doing, the Founders expressly limited Congress’s 
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power to only those powers enumerated “herein” the Constitution.  See United 
States v. Ho, 311 F.3d 589, 596 (5th Cir. 2002) (“The Constitution creates a federal 
government of limited and enumerated powers, and in particular a Congress of 
limited and enumerated powers.  The Article I Vesting Clause confirms this 
proposition, vesting in Congress “[a]ll legislative powers herein granted.”  
(Internal citations omitted)); see also U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 
779, 793 n.9 (1995) (explaining that the Founders of the Constitution were keenly 
aware of the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius (i.e., the enumeration 
of some excludes all others)).   
3. The doctrine of enumerated powers was embraced 
during discussion and ratification of the proposed 
Constitution.   
 In the weeks and months following the Constitutional Convention, 
federalists promoting the ratification of the Constitution extolled the principle of 
enumerated powers to such an extent that the Constitution may not have been 
ratified had such a principle not been explicitly included.  As one Massachusetts 
newspaper explained, “‘The constitution defines the powers of Congress; & every 
power, not expressly delegated to that body, remains in the several state 
legislatures.’”  Lash, supra, at 1595 n.90 (quoting Editorial, Federal Constitution, 
Mass. Mercury (Salem), Jan. 15, 1788, at 1).  Similarly, a Virginia newspaper 
supporting ratification declared that “‘should Congress attempt to exercise any 
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powers which are not expressly delegated to them, their acts would be considered 
as void, and disregarded.’”  Id. at 1595 (quoting Alexander White, To the Citizens 
of Virginia, Winchester Va. Gazette, Feb. 29, 1788).   
At the Connecticut Convention, Oliver Ellsworth explained that, “If the 
United States go beyond their powers, if they make a law which the Constitution 
does not authorize, it is void; and the judicial power, the national judges, who, to 
secure their impartiality, are to be made independent, will declare it to be void.”  
Oliver Ellsworth, Speech in the Connecticut Ratifying Convention (Jan. 7, 1788), 
reprinted in Jonathan Elliot, 2 The Debates In The Several State Conventions On 
The Adoption Of The Federal Constitution 196 (Ayer Co. 1987) (1859).  Likewise, 
in the North Carolina Convention, Archibald Maclain explained that “‘[t]he powers 
of Congress are limited and enumerated . . . .  It is as plain a thing as possibly can 
be, that Congress can have no power but what we expressly give them.’”  Lash, 
supra, at 1596 (quoting Archibald Maclain, Remarks Before the Convention of the 
State of North Carolina (July 28, 1788)).  James Wilson succinctly expressed the 
principle of enumerated powers when he explained, at the Pennsylvania ratifying 
convention, that “the supreme power . . . resides in the PEOPLE, as the fountain of 
government . . . .  They can delegate it in such proportions, to such bodies, on such 
terms, and under such limitations, as they think proper.”  James Wilson, Speech of 
Case: 10-2347   Document: 14-1    Date Filed: 01/21/2011    Page: 21
 13 
 
Dec. 4, 1787, available at http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents 
/v1ch2s14.html. 
 Perhaps the most famous series of newspaper articles supporting ratification 
of the Constitution, The Federalist, expressed similar perspectives.  Alexander 
Hamilton explained that “the State governments would clearly retain all the rights 
of sovereignty which they before had, and which were not . . . exclusively 
delegated to the United States.”  The Federalist No. 32, at 241 (Alexander 
Hamilton) (Wright ed. 1961), available at 
http://www.constitution.org/fed/federa32.htm.  James Madison likewise provided 
that “the proposed government cannot be deemed a national one; since its 
jurisdiction extends to certain enumerated objects only, and leaves to the several 
States a residuary and inviolable sovereignty over all other objects.”  
The Federalist No. 39, at 285 (James Madison) (Wright ed. 1961), available at 
http://www.constitution.org/fed/federa39.htm; see also The Federalist No. 45, at 
328 (James Madison) (Wright ed. 1961), available at 
http://www.constitution.org/fed/federa45.htm (“The powers delegated by the 
proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and defined.  Those 
which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite.”).     
Indeed, Madison, colloquially known as the “father of the Constitution,” 
West Lynne Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 193 n.9 (1994), repeatedly 
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explained the constitutional principle of enumerated powers even after ratification.  
In 1791, Madison clarified that “‘[n]o power . . . not enumerated could be inferred 
from the general nature of Government.  Had the power of making treaties, for 
example, been omitted, however necessary it might have been, the defect could 
only have been lamented or supplied by an amendment to the Constitution.’”  
Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 6 U. 
Pa. J. Const. L. 183, 192–93 (2003) (quoting 1 Annals of Congress 1950 (Joseph 
Gales ed., (1791)).  As Madison said in 1792, during the Second Congress, “I, sir, 
have always conceived—I believe those who proposed the Constitution 
conceived—it is still more fully known, and more material to observe, that those 
who ratified the Constitution conceived—that this is not an indefinite government, 
deriving its powers from the general terms prefixed to the specified powers—but a 
limited government, tied down to the specified powers, which explain and define 
the general terms.”  On the Cod Fisheries Bill, granting Bounties (1792), available 
at http://www.constitution.org/ je/je4_cong_deb_12.htm.  And, in 1794, Madison 
wrote that, “‘[w]hen the people have formed a Constitution, they retain those rights 
which they have not expressly delegated.’” Lash, supra, at 1597 (quoting 4 Annals 
of Congress 934 (1794)). 
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4. The Bill of Rights demonstrates the scope and depth 
of the doctrine of enumerated powers. 
 So widely accepted was the principle of enumerated powers amongst the 
Founders that the idea of a Bill of Rights had “never struck the mind of any 
member of the late convention till . . . within three days of the dissolution of that 
body, and even then, of so little account was the idea, that it passed off in a short 
conversation, without introducing a formal debate, or assuming the shape of a 
motion.”  James Wilson and John Smilie, James Wilson and John Smilie Debate 
the Need for a Bill of Rights (Nov. 28, 1787).  Importantly, the initial rejection of a 
Bill of Rights was not a repudiation of individual rights in favor of a national 
government of plenary powers.  Instead, the Bill of Rights was opposed by many 
delegates because of its implication on the enumerated powers doctrine.6   
 As James Wilson, one of the five members of the Committee of Detail at the 
Constitutional Convention, expounded at the Pennsylvania ratifying convention: 
                                                 
6 This was distinctly different from what existed in England. 
Bills of rights had possessed a relevance in England where there is a 
king and a House of Lords, quite distinct with respect to power and 
interest from the rest of the people.  Since the English kings had 
claimed all power and jurisdiction, bills of rights like the Magna Carta 
had been considered by them as grants to the people.  A bill of rights 
was used in England to limit the king’s prerogative; he could trample 
on the liberties of the people in every case which was not within 
the restraint of the bill of rights.   
Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 539 
(University of North Carolina Press 1969) (internal quotations omitted).   
Case: 10-2347   Document: 14-1    Date Filed: 01/21/2011    Page: 24
 16 
 
In all societies, there are many powers and rights, which cannot be 
particularly enumerated.  A bill of rights annexed to a constitution is 
an enumeration of the powers reserved.  If we attempt an 
enumeration, everything that is not enumerated is presumed to be 
given.  The consequence is, that an imperfect enumeration would 
throw all implied power into the scale of the government; and the 
rights of the people would be rendered incomplete. 
James Wilson, Remarks on the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention (Oct. 28, 1787), 
available at http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/index.asp?document=978. 
 Likewise, at the North Carolina ratifying convention, James Iredell, who 
would later become one of the original justices on the Supreme Court, proclaimed: 
[I]t would not only be useless, but dangerous, to enumerate a number 
of rights which are not intended to be given up; because it would be 
implying, in the strongest manner, that every right not included in the 
exception might be impaired by the government without usurpation; 
and it would be impossible to enumerate every one.  Let any one make 
what collection or enumeration of rights he pleases, I will 
immediately mention twenty or thirty more rights not contained in it. 
Calvin R. Massey, The Natural Law Component of the Ninth Amendment, 61 U. 
Cin. L. Rev. 49, 86 (1992) (quoting 3 The Debates in the Several State 
Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution 97 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 
1836) (July 29, 1788)).   
Even the anti-federalist Federal Farmer, who was skeptical of a 
consolidation of power in a federal government, acknowledged in 1788 that one of 
the proposed Constitution’s virtues was its lack of a Bill of Rights, because the 
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federal government would possess only specific, enumerated powers.  As he 
explained: 
Many needless observations, and idle distinctions, in my opinion, 
have been made respecting a bill of rights.  On the one hand, it seems 
to be considered as a necessary distinct limb of the constitution, and 
as containing a certain number of very valuable articles, which are 
applicable to all societies: and, on the other, as useless, especially in a 
federal government, possessing only enumerated power—nay, 
dangerous, as individual rights are numerous, and not easy to be 
enumerated in a bill or rights, and from articles, or stipulations, 
securing some of them, it may be inferred, that others not mentioned 
are surrendered . . . .  The supreme power is undoubtedly in the 
people, and it is a principle well established in my mind, that they 
reserve all powers not expressly delegated by them to those who 
govern; this is as true in forming a state as in forming a federal 
government . . . .  When we particularly enumerate the powers given, 
we ought either carefully to enumerate the rights reserved, or be 
totally silent about them; we must either particularly enumerate both, 
or else suppose the particular enumeration of the powers given 
adequately draws the line between them and the rights reserved, 
particularly to enumerate the former and not the latter, I think most 
advisable: however, as men appear generally to have their doubts 
about these silent reservations, we might advantageously enumerate 
the powers given, and then in general words, according to the mode 
adopted in the 2d art. of the confederation, declare all powers, rights 
and privileges, are reserved, which are not explicitly and expressly 
given up.  
Letter from the Federal Farmer No. 16 (Jan. 20, 1788) available at 
http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch14s32.html. 
Years later, Justice Arthur Goldberg, explained: 
Alexander Hamilton was opposed to a bill of rights on the ground that 
it was unnecessary because the Federal Government was a 
government of delegated powers and it was not granted the power to 
intrude upon fundamental personal rights.  The Federalist, No. 84 
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(Cooke ed., 1961), at 578–579.  He also argued, “I go further, and 
affirm that bills of rights, in the sense and in the extent in which they 
are contended for, are not only unnecessary in the proposed 
constitution, but would even be dangerous.  They would contain 
various exceptions to powers which are not granted; and on this very 
account, would afford a colourable pretext to claim more than were 
granted.  For why declare that things shall not be done which there is 
no power to do?  Why for instance, should it be said, that the liberty 
of the press shall not be restrained, when no power is given by which 
restrictions may be imposed?  I will not contend that such a provision 
would confer a regulating power; but it is evident that it would 
furnish, to men disposed to usurp, a plausible pretence for claiming 
that power.”  Id., at 579.  
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 489 n.4 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).   
The Ninth Amendment, which provides, “The enumeration in the 
Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others 
retained by the people,” and the Tenth Amendment, which provides, “The powers 
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the 
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people,” were included in 
the Bill of Rights specifically to preserve, unequivocally, the doctrine of 
enumerated powers.  Id. at 488–92 (Goldberg, J. concurring).  Indeed, as Justice 
Goldberg wrote: 
The [Ninth] Amendment is almost entirely the work of James 
Madison.  It was introduced in Congress by him and passed the House 
and Senate with little or no debate and virtually no change in 
language.  It was proffered to quiet expressed fears that a bill of 
specifically enumerated rights could not be sufficiently broad to cover 
all essential rights and that the specific mention of certain rights 
would be interpreted as a denial that others were protected.  
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In presenting the proposed Amendment, Madison said: 
It has been objected also against a bill of rights, that, by 
enumerating particular exceptions to the grant of power, 
it would disparage those rights which were not placed in 
that enumeration; and it might follow by implication, that 
those rights which were not singled out, were intended to 
be assigned into the hands of the General Government, 
and were consequently insecure.  This is one of the most 
plausible arguments I have ever heard urged against the 
admission of a bill of rights into this system; but, I 
conceive, that it may be guarded against.  I have 
attempted it, as gentlemen may see by turning to the last 
clause of the fourth resolution (the Ninth Amendment).   
I Annals of Congress 439 (Gales and Seaton ed. 1834). 
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 488–90 (Goldberg, J., concurring).  It is, therefore, clear that 
the debate over the addition of a bill of rights, and the inclusion therein of the 
Ninth and Tenth Amendments, demonstrate the scope and depth of the doctrine of 
enumerated powers.  
5. The Supreme Court has consistently recognized that 
the federal government possesses only limited, 
enumerated powers. 
A long line of cases has established conclusively that the Constitution 
creates a federal government of limited, enumerated powers.  First, in the 1803 
seminal case of Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803), Chief 
Justice Marshall explained: “The powers of the legislature are defined and limited; 
and that those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written.”  
Later, in 1819, the Supreme Court again proclaimed that “[t]his government is 
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acknowledged by all, to be one of enumerated powers.”  M’Culloch v. Maryland, 
17 U.S. 316, 405 (1819).  Five years later, the Supreme Court again explained that 
the Constitution “contains an enumeration of powers expressly granted by the 
people to their government.”  Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 187 (1824).  
Indeed, “the constant declaration of this court from the beginning is that this 
government is one of enumerated powers.”  Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 87 
(1907).  
 More recent decisions reach the same conclusion.  In City of Boerne v. 
Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 516 (1997), the Supreme Court proclaimed, “Under our 
Constitution, the Federal Government is one of enumerated powers.”  Likewise, in 
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995), the Supreme Court reaffirmed 
that:   
We start with first principles.  The Constitution creates a Federal 
Government of enumerated powers.  See Art. I, § 8.  As James 
Madison wrote:  “The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution 
to the federal government are few and defined.  Those which are to 
remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite.”  The 
Federalist No. 45, pp. 292–293 (C. Rossiter ed., 1961).  This 
constitutionally mandated division of authority “was adopted by the 
Framers to ensure protection of our fundamental liberties.”  Gregory 
v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  “Just as the separation and independence of the coordinate 
branches of the Federal Government serve to prevent the 
accumulation of excessive power in any one branch, a healthy balance 
of power between the States and the Federal Government will reduce 
the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front.”  Ibid. 
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Id.  Again, in 2000, the Supreme Court explained that, “With its careful 
enumeration of federal powers and explicit statement that all powers not granted to 
the Federal Government are reserved, the Constitution cannot realistically be 
interpreted as granting the Federal Government an unlimited license to regulate.”  
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 619 n.8 (2000).  Therefore, the Supreme 
Court held that “[e]very law enacted by Congress must be based on one or more of 
its powers enumerated in the Constitution.”  Morrison, 529 U.S. at 607. 
 Ultimately, the principle that the federal government is one of limited, 
enumerated powers is so well documented in the history of the Colonies, so 
thoroughly and painstakingly set forth in documents that led up to the Constitution, 
as well as in the Constitution and Bill of Rights themselves, and so thoughtfully 
protected in the Supreme Court cases that interpreted the Constitution and Bill of 
Rights, that one cannot seriously argue that it is not a bedrock principle—perhaps 
the single most important principle—enshrined in the Constitution.   
II. THIS COURT SHOULD HOLD THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL; OTHERWISE, THE FEDERAL 
GOVERNMENT WOULD CEASE TO BE A GOVERNMENT 
OF ENUMERATED POWERS.   
The plain language of the Commerce Clause, even with help from the 
Necessary and Proper Clause, which provides that Congress has the power to 
“make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper” to execute the other 
enumerated powers, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18, does not empower Congress to 
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regulate any and all forms of human activity or inactivity.  Morrison, 529 U.S. at 
607–08 (“[E]ven [our] modern-era precedents which have expanded congressional 
power under the Commerce Clause confirm that this power is subject to outer 
limits.”).  Yet, by passing the Individual Mandate, that is precisely what Congress 
has done.  Indeed, Congress has, for the first time in history, required individuals 
to purchase a product against their will.7  See Florida ex rel. McCollum v. U.S. 
Dept. of Health and Human Services, 716 F. Supp. 2d. 1120, 1163 (N.D. Fla. 
2010) (“the Commerce Clause and Necessary and Proper Clause have never been 
applied in such a manner before”); Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 702 F. 
Supp. 2d 598, 609 (E.D. Va. 2010) (“The congressional enactment under review . . 
. literally forges new ground and extends Commerce Clause powers beyond its 
current high watermark.”).   
                                                 
7 Even the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office (“CBO”) has opined that such 
federal action is unprecedented: 
 
A mandate requiring all individuals to purchase health insurance 
would be an unprecedented form of federal action.  The government 
has never required people to buy any good or service as a condition of 
lawful residence in the United States.  An Individual Mandate would 
have two features that, in combination, would make it unique.  First, it 
would impose a duty on individuals as members of society.  Second, it 
would require people to purchase a specific service that would be 
heavily regulated by the federal government.  
CBO, The Budgetary Treatment of an Individual Mandate to Buy Health 
Insurance, 1 (1994), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/48xx/doc4816 
/doc38.pdf. 
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In passing the PPACA, Congress has, for the first time ever, asserted the 
power to regulate economic inactivity—the decision to refrain from engaging in 
interstate commerce—through the Commerce Clause and Necessary and Proper 
Clause.  See Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 612 (“Never before has 
the Commerce Clause and associated Necessary and Proper Clause been extended 
this far.”); Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768, 2010 WL 5059718, 
*12 (E.D. Va. 2010) (“Every application of Commerce Clause power found to be 
constitutionally sound by the Supreme Court involved some form of action, 
transaction, or deed placed in motion by an individual or legal entity.”).   
Yet, in upholding the constitutionality of the Individual Mandate, the 
District Court held that “individuals’ decisions about how and when to pay for 
health care are activities” that can be regulated under the Commerce Clause.  
Liberty University v. Geithner, ___F. Supp. 2d___, 2010 WL 4860299, *14.  This 
stands in stark contrast to the Eastern District of Virginia, which held:  “[A] 
decision not to purchase a product, such as health insurance, is not an economic 
activity.  It is a virtual state of repose—or idleness—the converse of activity.”  
Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 610.  Importantly, if the holding of 
the court below is allowed to stand, and an individual’s “decision” is considered an 
“activity” that can be regulated under the Commerce Clause, the federal 
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government would no longer be limited to its enumerated powers.  This centuries-
old doctrine upon which the federal government is based would be eviscerated.   
A. If The Individual Mandate Is A Valid Exercise Of The 
Commerce Power, The Commerce Clause Will Render The 
Other Enumerated Powers Superfluous.  
If the District Court’s broad interpretation of the Commerce Clause is 
allowed to stand, the Commerce Clause will effectively swallow up all the other 
enumerated powers in the Constitution, resulting in one omnipotent governmental 
power.  Indeed, if the Commerce Clause empowers Congress to regulate mere 
economic “decisions” without a corresponding economic “activity,” “many of 
Congress’ other enumerated powers under Art. I, § 8, are wholly superfluous.”  
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 588 (Thomas, J. concurring); Appellants’ Bf. at 11–12.  If 
Congress has the power, pursuant to the Commerce Clause, to regulate an 
individual’s inactivity, i.e. “decisions,” as well as interstate commerce, then: 
[T]here is no need for the Constitution to specify that Congress may 
enact bankruptcy laws, cl. 4, or coin money and fix the standard of 
weights and measures, cl. 5, or punish counterfeiters of United States 
coin and securities, cl. 6.  Likewise, Congress would not need the 
separate authority to establish post offices and post roads, cl. 7, or to 
grant patents and copyrights, cl. 8, or to “punish Piracies and Felonies 
committed on the high Seas,” cl. 10.  It might not even need the power 
to raise and support an Army and Navy, cls. 12 and 13, for fewer 
people would engage in commercial shipping if they thought that a 
foreign power could expropriate their property with ease. . . .  An 
interpretation of cl. 3 that makes the rest of § 8 superfluous simply 
cannot be correct. 
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Lopez, 514 U.S. at 588–89 (Thomas, J., concurring); see also United States v. 
Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 520 n.6 (2008) (discussing the often-cited canon of 
construction providing that text should be interpreted such that no provision is 
rendered superfluous); Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. 540, 571 (1840) (“In 
expounding the Constitution of the United States, every word must have its due 
force, and appropriate meaning; for it is evident from the whole instrument, that no 
word was unnecessarily used, or needlessly added.”). 
B. If The Individual Mandate Is A Valid Exercise Of The 
Commerce Power, The Principle Of A Limited Federal 
Government With Enumerated Powers Will Be Eviscerated. 
Neither the Commerce Clause standing alone, nor in conjunction with the 
Necessary and Proper Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18, can be interpreted 
broadly and still remain consistent with the doctrine of enumerated powers.  As 
Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story remarked:  
What, then, is the true constitutional sense of the words “necessary 
and proper” in this clause?  It has been insisted by the advocates of a 
rigid interpretation, that the word “necessary” is here used in its 
close and most intense meaning; so that it is equivalent to absolutely 
and indispensably necessary.  It has been said, that the 
constitution allows only the means, which are necessary; not those, 
which are merely convenient for effecting the enumerated powers.  
If such a latitude of construction be given to this phrase, as to give 
any non-enumerated power, it will go far to give every one; for there 
is no one, which ingenuity might not torture into a convenience in 
some way or other to some one of so long a list of enumerated 
powers.  It would swallow up all the delegated powers, and reduce 
the whole to one phrase.  Therefore it is, that the constitution has 
restrained them to the necessary means; that is to say, to those 
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means, without which the grant of the power would be nugatory.  A 
little difference in the degree of convenience cannot constitute the 
necessity, which the constitution refers to. 
Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution 3, § 1239 (1833) available at 
http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/a1_8_18s21.html. 
Should the Individual Mandate be upheld as a lawful exercise of the 
Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause, the limited federal 
government of enumerated powers would be transformed into an omnipotent 
government of plenary powers.  Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564 (“if we were to accept the 
Government’s arguments, we are hard pressed to posit any activity by an 
individual that Congress is without power to regulate”).  Indeed, if Congress is 
empowered to regulate all spheres of activity—or inactivity—in an individual’s 
life, except those explicitly protected in the Bill of Rights, the doctrine of 
enumerated powers, upon which the United States was founded, would cease to 
exist as to the federal government.  Under such a scheme, unalienable rights would 
be derived not from individuals, as the Declaration of Independence and the 
Constitution provide, but, instead, would exist solely as a permissive license by the 
federal government.  To be sure, “[i]f the Court always defers to Congress . . . , 
little may be left to the notion of enumerated powers.”  Gonzales v. Raich, 
545 U.S. 1, 47 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  No court that takes its duty to 
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interpret and uphold the Constitution seriously may authorize such a radical 
metamorphosis of a centuries old doctrine at the very foundation of the Nation.   
CONCLUSION 
 For the forgoing reasons, this Court should hold the Individual Mandate 
unconstitutional and reverse the District Court’s judgment.  
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